1998

最新文章

• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right AI翻译
  作者：Irmen, A; Thisse, JF
  作者单位：University of Lausanne; Universite Catholique Louvain; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
  摘要：Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi-characteristics space. In the location game with n characteristics, firms choose to maximize differentiation in the dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in the others when Ihc salience coefficient of the former is sufficiently large, Thus, the principle of minimum differenti...
• Intrinsic preference for information AI翻译
  作者：Grant, S; Kajii, A; Polak, B
  作者单位：Australian National University; University of Tsukuba; Yale University
  摘要：Suppose agents value information not only to make contingent plans but also intrinsically. Wow are such attitudes toward information related to attitudes toward risk? We generalize the Kreps-Porteus recursive expected utility model, dropping both recursivity and expected utility. There is a geometric analogy between risk and information. We characterize intrinsic information loving, in general, by a substitution property analogous to multivariate risk loving; and, for smooth preferences, by th...
• Are two a good representative for many? AI翻译
  作者：Kerschbamer, R; Maderner, N
  作者单位：University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
  摘要：This paper studies a discrete formulation of the screening model with type-dependent reservation utilities. II closes the pap between various pooling results derived in continuous-type models and the separating results obtained for the binary case. We show that binary models do not capture the most interesting features of general models with countervailing incentives. However, as soon as at least three types are introduced all interesting results of the continuum case can be replicated in a di...
• Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities AI翻译
  作者：Ma, JP
  作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Camden
  摘要：This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agents is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner. We provide an alternative definition of the coalitional form game to resolve this problem so that the balancedness of the new defined game p...
• Introduction to market psychology and nonlinear endogenous business cycles AI翻译
  作者：Grandmont, JM
  作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• Market demand functions in the capital asset pricing model AI翻译
  作者：Bottazzi, JM; Hens, T; Loffler, A
  作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Bielefeld; Free University of Berlin
  摘要：We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Homogeneity, Walras' Law, and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand on finite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n different beta pricing formulas. Endowment perturbations in these economies cannot decrease the number of equilibria below n. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Coordination in auctions with entry AI翻译
  作者：Campbell, CM
  作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
  摘要：We examine self-enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly. Conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria. Under slightly stronger conditions, within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders. If preplay communication is possible, every no-communication equilibrium payoff is interim Pareto-dominated for the bidders...
• Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale AI翻译
  作者：de Frutos, MA
  作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
  摘要：We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost...
• On the intransitivity of preferences consistent with similarity relations AI翻译
  作者：Vila, X
  作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
  摘要：We examine Rubinstein's approach to decision making based on the use of similarity relations. More specifically, we show that any attempt to order bundles of three or more alternatives using similarity relations will generate intransitivities. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Representability of interval orders AI翻译
  作者：Oloriz, E; Candeal, JC; Indurain, E
  作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Zaragoza
  摘要：We obtain a full characterization of the representability of interval orders by a pair of real-valued functions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.