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作者：Shitovitz, B; Spiegel, M
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：In this paper, we derive qualitative and asymptotic results on Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies. In a discrete finite economy with similar consumers (e.g., sharing the same Cobb-Douglas utility), we show that the consumer with the biggest initial endowment prefers the proportional Lindahl over his Cournot-Nash bundle. The asymptotic results are derived using a model of a mixed economy with an atomless sector of consumers as an idealization for economies with fe...
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作者：Goenka, A; Kelly, DL; Spear, SE
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Miami; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines an overlapping generations version of the Shapley-Shubik market game. We show existence of equilibria for the simple one commodity model and analyze the dynamics of the equilibrium trajectories generated in the model. Because of the non-linearities generated by strategic interaction of agents in the model, we find that complex and chaotic equilibrium dynamics are possible in this model for a much broader range of preferences than those for which Grandmont (Econometrica 53, ...
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作者：An, MY
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper provides a complete characterization of logconcavity, an increasingly popular concept in the economics of uncertainty and information. New and known results are proven without assuming that density functions are differentiable. A systematic comparison between logconcavity and logconvexity is made and the source of the asymmetries between the two is investigated. The key difference is that logconcavity is preserved under one-sided integrations regardless of the types of distribution ...
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作者：Jullien, B; Picard, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：A two period monetary overlapping generations model with efficiency wages is constructed, in which the workers' effort is unobservable and wage contracts verify an incentive compatibility constraint to prevent shirking. Irs dynamics is similar ro the one of a market clearing neoclassical model driven by intertemporal substitution effects, in which the labour supply curve would be replaced by a nonshirking condition. But normative properties of macroeconomic policies differ. In particular emplo...
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作者：Coles, MG; Wright, R
作者单位：University of Essex; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：Several problems in economic theory can be formulated as a dynamic programming problem, plus an additional incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint requires the continuation value along the chosen sequence, at any point in time, to be larger than some prescribed Function of the state, the control, or perhaps both. This constraint changes the nature of the problem in a substantial way: for instance, even if the problem is discounted, standard arguments based on contraction principles...
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作者：Kocherlakota, NR
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible (following Myerson [8], the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment). The environments feature either memory or money. Memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past. Money is defined as an object that does not enter ...
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作者：Edlin, AS; Shannon, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economists commonly seek to show that one variable increases in response to changes in another variable. This paper provides sufficient conditions to draw such strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems with and without binding constraints. These results extend the lattice-theoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon [10] by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from first-order conditions. We illustrate the importance of...
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作者：Grandmont, JM; Pintus, P; de Vilder, R
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We develop simple geometrical methods to study local indeterminacy, bifurcations, and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria near a steady state, in nonlinear two dimensional economic models. We present in particular a simple. constructive, geometrical characterization of the support of stochastic sunspot equilibria, not only arbitrarily near a steady state, but also along local bifurcations. These methods are applied to a simple aggregative model to study in particular the influence of capital-labor...
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作者：Marschak, T; Reichelstein, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Our model of network mechanisms studies individually addressed messages between any two members of an organization. For a given organizational objective function, wt examine communication costs, as measured by the number of message variables that agents need to exchange at equilibrium in order to achieve the desired action choices. Fur the class of objective functions we consider. price mechanisms are shown to minimize communication costs. IT cine requires the network tu be hierarchical, the o...
