1998

最新文章

• Decentralization and collusion AI翻译
  作者：Baliga, S; Sjöström, T
  作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University
  摘要：We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude. Due to limited liability the Cease theorem does not apply. The distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal, which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard. The optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way (decentralization) witho...
• Multiplicity of cournot equilibria and involuntary unemployment AI翻译
  作者：Kaas, L
  作者单位：University of Bielefeld
  摘要：In an overlapping generations model with Cournot competition on the goods market it is shown that a continuum of stationary states and perfect foresight trajectories exists with unemployment at arbitrary low wages. Decisive for this is the influence that different forecast functions have on the objective demand curve, even though they are consistent with perfect foresight. With an example it is shown that simple adaptive and constant memory forecast rules generate such unemployment equilibria....
• Capacity utilization under increasing returns to scale AI翻译
  作者：Wen, Y
  作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
  摘要：This paper overcomes an important objection against the empirical relevance of the Benhabib-Farmer model as a potential account of actual business cycle fluctuations. This is attributable to an elasticity effect and a returns-to-scale effect of capacity utilization. These effects are closely related to the empirical puzzles that capital appears to play an insignificant role in explaining cyclical movements in output and that the estimated labor elasticity appears to be larger than labor's shar...
• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility AI翻译
  作者：Muller, HM
  作者单位：University of Mannheim
  摘要：The continuous-time principal-agent model with exponential utility developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom admits a simple closed-form solution: The second-best sharing rule is a linear function of aggregated output. Here. we show that the first-best sharing rule is also linear in aggregated output. The result follows immediately from the separability of the problem and the fact that principal and agent both have CARA utility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits AI翻译
  作者：Schlag, KH
  作者单位：University of Bonn
  摘要：Individuals in a finite population repeatedly choose among actions yielding uncertain payoffs. Between choices, each individual observes the action and realized outcome of one other individual. We restrict our search to learning rules with limited memory that increase expected payoffs regardless of the distribution underlying their realizations. It is shown that the rule that outperforms all others is that which imitates the action of an observed individual (whose realized outcome is better th...
• Constant risk aversion AI翻译
  作者：Safra, Z; Segal, U
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
  摘要：Constant risk aversion means that adding a constant to all outcomes of two distributions, or multiplying all their outcomes by the same positive number, will not change the preference relation between them. We prove several representation theorems, where constant risk aversion is combined with other axioms to imply specific functional forms. Among other things, we obtain a form of disappointment aversion theory without using the concept of reference point in the axioms, and a form of the rank ...
• The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions AI翻译
  作者：Lopomo, G
  作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University
  摘要：With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named Simple Sequential Auctions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments AI翻译
  作者：Bergin, J; Sen, A
  作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
  摘要：We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-te...
• On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard AI翻译
  作者：Phelan, C
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents. Finally, it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether t...
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk AI翻译
  作者：Crawford, V
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
  摘要：This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in ames with communication focusing on environments where talk is cheap in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. (C) 1998 Academic Press.