-
作者:Lahiri, A; Puhakka, M
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Helsinki
摘要:This paper analyzes the implications of habit persistance preferences for savings and equilibrium dynamics in the contest of an overlapping generations model under pure exchange. We show that habit persistence can convert an economy which otherwise has no role for government currency into an economy where there does exist a role for such currency. Further. the increased saving induced by habit persistence implies that governments are able to float higher levels of deficits in such economies re...
-
作者:Govindan, S; Robson, AJ
摘要:Gul and Pearce argue that forward induction has much less power as an equilibrium refinement than is generally supposed. The present comment raises the issue: What does admissibility imply for Gul and Pearce's analysis? In a key example, the precise equilibrium constructed by Gul and Pearce depends on a strategy which is not admissible. Even if ali equilibria are considered, it is not possible to preserve the Gul and Pearce results under admissibility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者:Alvarez, F; Stokey, NL
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:We show that the basic existence, uniqueness, and convergence results of dynamic programming hold when the return function is homogeneous of degree 0 less than or equal to 1 and the constraints are homogeneous of degree one. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者:Robles, J
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要:This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is Found that if behavior is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者:Pesendorfer, M
作者单位:Yale University
摘要:Agents have to decide whether a polluting plant will be operated or not. Agents' disutility (cost) from pollution is privately known, but correlated across agents. Incentive compatible mechanisms are characterized under the assumption that transfer payments are non-negative. The implementability constraint is similar to the independence case, except that virtual utilities are diminished by a factor due to the correlation of agents' types. As correlation vanishes, the implementability constrain...
-
作者:Fishman, A; Rob, R
作者单位:University of Haifa; University of Pennsylvania
摘要:This paper examines the effect of competition on firms' efforts to experiment and learn about market demand. Consumers are assumed to know prices only at sellers they have actually visited, but must bear search costs to Find the prices of other sellers. Under these conditions we show that firms' incentives to experiment are diluted by comparison with the monopoly case and that this effect is stronger the smaller the search cost. The learning environment we portray gives rise to several time pa...
-
作者:Guo, JT; Lansing, KJ
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Riverside; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要:It has been shown that a one-sector real business cycle model with sufficient increasing returns in production may possess an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate business cycles driven by animal spirits of agents. This paper shows how an income tax schedule that exhibits a progressivity Feature can ensure saddle path stability in such a framework and thereby stabilize the economy against sunspot fluctuations. Conversely, an economy with a flat or regressive tax schedul...
-
作者:Kalai, E; Ledyard, JO
作者单位:Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要:In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation folk theorem for patient implementers, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable. journal c...
-
作者:Wallace, N
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
-
作者:Pakes, A; Ericson, R
作者单位:Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要:This paper considers two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry). Both the characteristics of firm level panel data sets and the nature of the questions we characteristically ask of them imply that models with these features are likely to underlie most detailed empirical work on microdata sets. The models we consider are a Bayesian learning model due to Jovanovic [20], a...