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作者：Hong, L
作者单位：Syracuse University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper considers Feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for Feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences bu...
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作者：Glazer, J; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on thr basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two cultures. Tn one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the First culture, every mechanism wi...
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作者：Serrano, R; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Brown University; University of Osaka
摘要：We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the Nash product of their utilities, subject to efficiency, is critical. The in...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies a model of a two-armed bandit played in parallel by two or more players. Players observe the actions of all other players, but not the outcome of their experiments. It is shown that if the parameters of the two arms (i.e., their success probabilities) are different by a fixed margin, all players eventually settle on the same arm with probability one in any Nash equilibrium of the game. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Bhattacharya, J; Guzman, MG; Shell, K
作者单位：Cornell University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Wellesley College
摘要：We investigate sunspot equilibria in a static, one-commodity model with taxes and transfers denominated in money units. Volatility in this economy is purely monetary, since the only uncertainty is about the price level. We construct simple, robust examples of sunspot equilibria that are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria. We also identify the source of these SSEs: Equilibrium in the securities market is determined as if there were no restricted consumers and the unrestricted con...
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作者：Cremer, J; Khalil, F; Rochet, JC
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; University of Southampton; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: He will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. We identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a maybe informed agent. (C) 1998 Academic Pr...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We ask how the best known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions-the value, proportional, and serial mechanisms-should be extended to arbitrary problems. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares should be invariant under (essentially) all increasing transformations of the measuring scales. Following the value approach first, we present an axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik rule based on Ordinality. Next, we define and axiomatize t...
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作者：Heifetz, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In their seminal paper, Mertens and Zamir (Int. Game Theory 14 (1985), 1-29) proved the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space which consists of all possible types. Their method of proof depends crucially on topological assumptions. Whether such assumptions are essential to the existence of a universal space remained an open problem. Here we prove that a universal type space does exist even when spaces an defined in pure measure theoretic terms. Heifetz and Samet (mimeo, Tel Aviv Univers...
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作者：Franke, G; Stapleton, RC; Subrahmanyam, MG
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Lancaster University; New York University
摘要：In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Since investors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-taking behavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no background risk ha...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Levine, D; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. if the Flay of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the grime where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions ...
