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作者：Gossner, O
摘要：Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 072. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Alcalde, J; Perez-Castrillo, D; Romero-Medina, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism wh...
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作者：Benhabib, J
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This introduction provides an overview of the three papers included in this symposium and highlights their contribution to the literature. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Binmore, K; Piccione, M; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Southampton; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a MESS causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game....
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作者：Donaldson, D; Weymark, JA
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We show that any quasiordering is the intersection of orderings. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stage game is played for many periods. Each player maximizes discounted expected payoffs, given updated beliefs about opponent's strategies. For the case of infinitely repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9] show that, under absolute continuity, rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Absolute continuity, however, does not ensure convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play in games of long (but finite) horizon. I show that asymptotic continuity is equivalent to absolute continuity ...
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作者：Cellini, R; Lambertini, L
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation. We prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem, or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone. In the latter case, the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, as well as social planning. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C73, L13. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Keister, T
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
摘要：This paper examines the impact monetary redistribution policies have on the amount of sunspot-induced volatility in an economy. A dynamic model of segmented asset markets is presented in which the tax-transfer policy determines, in a continuous way, the influence sunspots can have on the general price level and on consumption. If the policy leads to a transfer of resources across segmentation lines, there exist equilibria in which sunspots affect consumption. The primary result is that there i...
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作者：Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：The standard criterion used to compare streams of payoffs in the undiscounted case is lim inf(T --> infinity) 1/T Sigma(t = 1)(T) u(x(t)). In this paper we approach the problem axiomatically. This sheds light on the behavioral underpinnings of such a rule and leads to a novel choice criterion, the Polya Index. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D90. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Li, YT; Wright, R
作者单位：National Tsing Hua University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study government transaction policies in search-theoretic models of money. We model government as a subset of agents, who are subject to the same random matching technology and other constraints as private agents, but who behave in an exogenous way regarding which objects they accept in trade and at what price. The objective is to see how these policies affect private agents' strategics, and hence the set of equilibria. We analyze how the effects depend on factors like the size of governmen...
