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作者：Dutta, J; Michel, P
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In this paper, we study the distribution of wealth in an economy with infinitely lived families. Individual generations of each family may or may not be altruistic. This is represented as a preference shock which follows a first-order Markov process within each Family, a feature representing imperfect altruism. Altruistic individuals care about the welfare of their children and are likely to leave bequests; selfish ones do not. This results in a non-trivial distribution of wealth among familie...
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作者：Hon-Snir, S; Monderer, D; Sela, A
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kajii, A; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distribution mu over a type space and payoff functions u. Probability distribution mu' is strategically close to mu if, for any bounded payoff functions u and any equilibrium of the game (mu, u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (mu', u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante ...
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作者：Polemarchakis, HM; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Columbia University
摘要：Competitive equilibrium allocations are indeterminate when the net trades in commodities are constrained, while the asset market is incomplete. The model encompasses economies with deferred payment for commodities, economies with nominal assets, and economies with bundling of commodities and assets. (C) 1998 Academic Press
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作者：Benhabib, J; Nishimura, K
作者单位：New York University; Kyoto University
摘要：We show that indeterminacy can easily arise in multisector models that have constant variable returns to scale and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast to models that require increasing returns to generate indeterminacy and which have been criticized on the basis of recent empirical estimates indicating that returns to scale are roughly constant and that market imperfections are small. We also show that we can calibrate our constant returns model with sunspots, using stan...
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作者：Tourky, R
作者单位：La Trobe University
摘要：Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (Econometrica 55 (1987), 1109-1137) proved that Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies in topological vector lattices are pseudo-equilibria. In this paper we extend their result to more general spaces. We consider pure trade economies in a vector lattice commodity space with a lattice ordered price space. By adapting the techniques of Mas-Colell and Richard (J. Econ. Theory 53 (1991), 1-11) we obtain the required decentralizing continuous price as the sup...
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作者：Banks, JS; Sundaram, RK
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. We assume that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule; this rule is Further required to be sequentially rational (i.e., no precommitment is allowed). We provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where (a) the principal adopts a cut-off rule under which agents ar...
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作者：Bhaskar, V
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze an evolutionary model with noisy pre-play communication, where the message received can differ from the message sent without the sender being aware of this. Noise implies that an inefficient strategy cannot push unsent messages, allowing these messages to be used by a mutant in order to coordinate upon an efficient outcome. This ensures that any neutrally stable strategy is efficient. Since noise restricts drift, we also have existence of evolutionarily stable sets in a larger class...
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作者：Huybens, E; Smith, BD
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider a small open economy with a costly state verification problem and binding reserve requirements. The presence of these frictions leads to the existence of two steady states with credit rationing. An increase in the money growth rate, the world interest rate or reserve requirements raises (lowers) GDP in the high (low) activity steady state. However, sufficiently large increases in money growth or the world interest rate can transform the high activity steady state from a sink to a s...
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作者：Karandikar, R; Mookherjee, D; Ray, D; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Boston University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：A 2 x 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience: but are occasionally subject to trembles. ...
