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作者：Bisin, A
作者单位：New York University
摘要：The present paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries and price-taking consumers. Intermediaries optimally choose the securities they issue and the bid-ask spread they charge. Financial intermediation is costly, and hence markets are endogenously incomplete. An appropriate equilibrium concept is developed, and existence is proved. Competitive equilibria for this class of economies display full indexation of securities payoffs a...
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作者：Rajan, U
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：The Bayesian approach to game theory is extended to a setting where players can believe that other players may tremble with infinitesimal probability. Here too, a player's type induces a probability distribution over Ether players' types. Two axioms of near rationality are introduced. Almost common knowledge of near rationality implies a strategy choice that survives one round of weak dominance followed by iterated strict dominance. Common knowledge of hierarchical rationality leads to iterate...
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作者：Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax. We show that under a proportional income tax scheme a Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but, in general. Nash equili...
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作者：Boylan, RT
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A new condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) implementation in environments with complete information. This result implies that all choice functions are CPNE-implementable when individuals' utility functions are bounded with respect to all variables-except for money-and are either analytic or quasi-linear. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the Full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using seque...
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作者：Carrillo, JD
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory Framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly. We consider a general multi-agent situation with externalities among agents, incomplete information, and type-dependent reservation utilities. When the regulator (optimally) leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents, centralized coordination reduces global activity. Coordination induces more activity when the principal (optimally) leaves ...
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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. The only uncertainty is modelled by sunspots. Agents' beliefs are heterogeneous, but eventually become homogeneous in the sense that agents' beliefs are identical in the limit. I show that if some states of nature occur rarely, then arbitrarily large market crashes may occur infinitely often. This result contrasts with Cass and Shell's (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983), 193-227) results which show that when be...
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作者：Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search. It is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high. The model produces persistent, hump-shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence...
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作者：Weder, M
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper develops a three sector dynamic general equilibrium model with the specific aim of evaluating the role of consumer durables in the generation and propagation of business cycles. The model displays indeterminacy at commonly considered realistic parameter restrictions and basically constant returns to scale. If calibrated at modest increasing returns to scale, the sunspots driven model version produces a close match to moments of aggregate U.S. data. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a model of an exchange economy with a continuum of individuals, we show that competitive equilibrium can be regarded as resulting from the elimination of arbitrage opportunities. Generically, the elimination of such opportunities results in a phenomenon we call the flattening effect of large numbers. The flattening effect provides a precise meaning to the statement that under perfect competition individuals cannot influence prices; they face perfectly elastic demands and supplies. The attra...
