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作者：Baliga, S; Morris, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yale University
摘要：We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Cabral, LMB
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance (the property whereby, in dynamic games, the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms). The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that. in equilibrium, the laggard chooses a less promising path, in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the lea...
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作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
摘要：A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
作者单位：University of Birmingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may r...
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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preference on which efficancy and coalitional strategygy-proofness are compatible, A preferenc relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining house. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and co...
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作者：Ehlers, L; Peters, H; Storcken, T
作者单位：Maastricht University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences oil the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterisation of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public...
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作者：Erosa, A; Gervais, M
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Queens University - Canada; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income, The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an ind...
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作者：Berliant, M; Peng, SK; Wang, P
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We formally explore Jacobs' idea that uncompensated knowledge spillovers are crucial for agglomeration by modeling location-dependent interfirm production externalities in a general-equilibrium linear-city framework. Good and factor allocation, firms' and households' locational choice, and wages and land rents are all endogenously determined. The unique equilibrium urban configuration may be concentrated (with monocentric firm locations), dispersed (with completely mixed firm/household locatio...
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作者：Boucekkine, R; de la Croix, D; Licandro, O
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Catholique Louvain; European University Institute; European University Institute
摘要：We study how economic growth is affected by demographics in an OLG model with a realistic survival law. Individuals optimally chose the dates at which they leave school to work and at which they retire. Endogenous growth arises thanks to the accumulation of generation-specific human capital. Favorable shifts in the survival probabilities induce longer schooling and later retirement but have an ambiguous effect on per-capita growth, The long-term relationship between fertility and per-capita gr...
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作者：Cooper, R; Corbae, D
作者单位：Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We analyze financial collapses, such as the one that occurred during the U.S. Great Depression, from the perspective of a monetary model with multiple equilibria. The multiplicity arises from the presence of a strategic complementarity due to increasing returns to scale in the intermediation process. Intermediaries provide the link between savers and firms who require working capital for production. Fluctuations in the intermediation process are driven by variations in the confidence agents pl...
