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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Haifa
摘要：Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Hauenschild, N
作者单位：University of Hamburg
摘要：This paper analyzes the impact of pay-as-you-go financed social security on the stochastic process for the capital stock in a stochastic overlapping generations model. It is shown that the probability distribution of the capital stock in absence of social security dominates that in a pay-as-you-go system in the sense of stochastic dominance. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the sufficient conditions ensuring the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a pay-as-you-go syste...
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作者：Hong, P; McAfee, RP; Nayyar, A
作者单位：Konkuk University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：A model with two types of consumers, shoppers and captives, is constructed that leads to an equilibrium price dispersion. Shoppers may hold inventories of the good; the level of consumer inventories leads to state-dependent price dispersions. It is shown that prices and quantities display negative serial correlation. The model is tested using grocery store data, which display the predicted correlations. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his or her valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information). The parties are risk neutral-they can rule out renegotiation and write complete contracts, It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivi...
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作者：Segal, U; Sobel, J
作者单位：Boston College; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U(x(1),..., x(n)) = min{X-k}, U(x(1),..., x(n)) = max {x(k)}, U(X-1,..., x(n)) = Sigmau(x(k)), or combinations of these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common component of two vectors does not reverse strict preferences, but may turn strict preferences into indifference. We discuss applications of our results to social choice. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：McLennan, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study problems in which each of finitely many agents must be allocated a single object, based on the agents' rankings of pure outcomes. A random allocation is ordinally efficient if it is not ordinally dominated in the sense of there being another random assignment that gives each agent a first order stochastically dominant distribution of objects. We show that any ordinally efficient random assignment maximizes the sum of expected utilities for some vector of vNM utility functions that are...
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作者：Orbay, H
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：This paper characterizes optimal stationary hierarchies based on an information processing model introduced by Radner. We show how the delay, size (number of processors), capacity (the size of each cohort processed), and throughput (frequency of cohort arrival) are related and determine a feasibility frontier in the space of these variables. The structure of efficient hierarchies implementing the points on the feasibility frontier is also specified, These structures are always nonregular; i.e,...
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作者：van der Laan, G; Talman, D; Yang, ZF
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University; Yokohama National University
摘要：In this paper we consider a class of economies with a Finite number of divisible commodities, linear production technologies, and indivisible goods and a finite number of agents. This class contains several well-known economies with indivisible goods and money as special cases. It is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indivisible commodities, if each agent initially own...
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作者：Aragones, E; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously cho...
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作者：Eraslan, H; Merlo, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q less than or equal to n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule. the equilibrium payoffs nee...
