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作者：Ishiguro, S
作者单位：Ritsumeikan University
摘要：This paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal agent model where verification of an agent's action is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the first best outcome to be implemented as an equilibrium, The equilibrium has the following features (i) The action level that the agent chooses is not verified even if it is possible. (ii) Nevertheless. the first best can be attained by m...
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作者：Martinelli, C
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information outcome when voters are only imperfectly informed about the alternatives. Under some continuity assumptions. the condition is also sufficient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria that exhibits convergence, The requirement is equivalent to that found by Milgrom [1979, Econometrica 47, 679 688] for information aggregation in single-prize auctions. An example illustrates that convergence ...
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作者：Gauthier, S
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：This paper studies relationships between the local determinacy of a stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight dynamics. and its local stability in dynamics arising from econometric learning procedures. Attention is focused on linear scalar economies where agents forecast only one period ahead, and with an arbitrary, but fixed, number of predetermined variables. In Such a framework, it is well known that there are no clear links between the determinacy of the stationary state in the perfe...
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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Greenwood, J; Seshadri, A
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Many would say that children are society's most precious resource. So, how should we invest in them? To gain insight into this question, a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed where children differ by ability. Parents invest time and money in their offspring, depending on their altruism. This allows their children to grow up as more productive adults. First, the efficient allocation is characterized, Next, this is compared with the outcome that arises when Financial markets are incom...
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作者：Schummer, J; Vohra, RV
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent...
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作者：Prescott, ES; Townsend, RM
作者单位：University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in ...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Dasgupta, I; Pattanaik, PK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Nottingham
摘要：We address the problem of aggregating demand across a group of consumers, who are identical in terms of wealth and face identical price vectors, but vary in their chosen consumption bundles. We show that, when a stochastic demand function is constructed to aggregate a number of deterministic demand functions, satisfaction of the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference by this stochastic demand function is weaker than the restriction that every underlying deterministic demand function sati...
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作者：Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We define an opportunity act as a mapping from an exogenously given objective state space to a set of lotteries over prizes. and consider preferences over opportunity acts, We allow the preferences to be possibly uncertainty averse. Our main theorem provides an axiomatization of the maxmin expected utility model. In the theorem we construct subjective states to complete the objective state space. As in E. Dekel et al. (Econometrica, in press), we obtain a unique subjective state space. We also...
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作者：Benoît, JP
作者单位：New York University
摘要：A Gibbard-Satterthwaite type theorem is established for random decision rules and rules that permit ties. The rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes. The theorem allows restrictions on the domain of rankings. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ghirardato, P; Marinacci, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Turin
摘要：The theory of subjective expected utility has been recently extended to allow ambiguity to matter for choice. We propose a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion by building on a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion. We characterize it for a preference model which encompasses some of the most popular models in the literature. We next build on these ideas to provide a definition of unambiguous act and event and show the characterization of the latter. As an illustration, we consider the clas...
