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作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Sotomayor, M
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buye...
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作者：Bikhchandani, S; Ostroy, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are nonadditive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) v...
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作者：Hauk, E; Saez-Marti, M
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which vi...
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作者：Hellwig, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：I study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the players' signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. The same condition also determines the convergence of com...
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作者：Mutuswami, S; Winter, E
作者单位：University of Essex; European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Cla...
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作者：Silver, J; Slud, E; Takamoto, K
作者单位：National Institutes of Health (NIH) - USA; NIH National Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (NIAID); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We describe an exchange market consisting of many agents with stochastic preferences for two goods. When individuals are indifferent between goods, statistical mechanics predicts that goods and wealth will have steady-state gamma distributions. Simulation studies show that gamma distributions arise for a broader class of preference distributions. We demonstrate this mathematically in the limit of large numbers of individual agents. These studies illustrate the potential power of a statistical ...
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作者：van Damme, E; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Tilburg University; Boston University
摘要：J. Bergin and B. Lipman (Econometrica 64 (1996), 943-956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56) and P. Young (Econometrica 61 (1993), 57-84) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability o...
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作者：Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses trembles to provide a definition of the convex bull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts...
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作者：Oyama, D
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players is repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n x n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresigh...
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作者：Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We consider the problem of representing a (possibly) incomplete preference relation by means of a vector-valued utility function. Continuous and semicontinuous representation results are reported in the case of preference relations that are, in a sense, not too incomplete. These results generalize some of the classical utility representation theorems of the theory of individual choice and paves the way towards developing a consumer theory that realistically allows individuals to exhibit some i...
