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作者：Halpern, JY
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Logical characterizations of the common prior assumption (CPA) are investigated. Two approaches are considered. The first is called frame distinguishability, and is similar in spirit to the approaches considered in the economics literature. Results similar to those obtained in the economics literature are proved here as well, namely, that we can distinguish finite spaces that satisfy the CPA from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, it is shown that, for the lan...
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作者：Anthonisen, N
作者单位：Mount Allison University
摘要：This paper shows that experimentation can have the effect of inducing outcomes that are far from Nash in a learning model similar to that studied by D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine (1993, Econometrica 61, 547-573). The game under consideration is a version of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the average length of players' lifetimes is arbitrarily large, but fixed. If the number of stages in the prisoner's dilemma is sufficiently large, then experimentation induces cooperation within t...
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作者：Manelli, AM
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-de ice in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-de ices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies. then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ambec, S; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); INRAE; University of Salerno; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the...
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作者：Azariadis, C; Galasso, V
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study the impact of fiscal constitutions on intergenerational transfers in an overlapping generation model with linear technology. Transfers represent outcomes of a voting game among selfish agents. Policies are decided one period at a time. Majoritarian systems, which accord voters maximum fiscal discretion, sustain all individually rational allocations, including dynamically inefficient ones. Constitutional rules, which give minorities veto power over fiscal policy changes proposed by the...
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作者：Chateauneuf, A; Gajdos, T; Wilthien, PH
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; ESSEC Business School
摘要：We reconsider the principles of diminishing transfer and dual diminishing transfer. It appears that if a Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) maximizer respects the principle of diminishing (resp. dual diminishing) transfer, then he or she behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model (resp, Yaari's dual model). This leads us to define the principle of strong diminishing transfer, which is a combination of the principles of diminishing and dual diminishing transfer. We give necessary...
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作者：Chade, H; Schlee, EE
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper revisits the well-known result of R. Radner and J. Stiglitz (1984, in Bayesian Models of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Amsterdam) which shows that, under certain conditions, the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range. Their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite, assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition. We provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcav...
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作者：Kovalenkov, A
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in Finite exchange economics (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economics. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economics. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Nandeibam, S
作者单位：University of Birmingham
摘要：We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for d...
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作者：Barberà, S; Beviá, C
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society, The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society ...
