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作者：Hong, P; McAfee, RP; Nayyar, A
作者单位：Konkuk University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：A model with two types of consumers, shoppers and captives, is constructed that leads to an equilibrium price dispersion. Shoppers may hold inventories of the good; the level of consumer inventories leads to state-dependent price dispersions. It is shown that prices and quantities display negative serial correlation. The model is tested using grocery store data, which display the predicted correlations. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his or her valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information). The parties are risk neutral-they can rule out renegotiation and write complete contracts, It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivi...
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作者：McLennan, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study problems in which each of finitely many agents must be allocated a single object, based on the agents' rankings of pure outcomes. A random allocation is ordinally efficient if it is not ordinally dominated in the sense of there being another random assignment that gives each agent a first order stochastically dominant distribution of objects. We show that any ordinally efficient random assignment maximizes the sum of expected utilities for some vector of vNM utility functions that are...
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作者：Orbay, H
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：This paper characterizes optimal stationary hierarchies based on an information processing model introduced by Radner. We show how the delay, size (number of processors), capacity (the size of each cohort processed), and throughput (frequency of cohort arrival) are related and determine a feasibility frontier in the space of these variables. The structure of efficient hierarchies implementing the points on the feasibility frontier is also specified, These structures are always nonregular; i.e,...
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作者：van der Laan, G; Talman, D; Yang, ZF
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University; Yokohama National University
摘要：In this paper we consider a class of economies with a Finite number of divisible commodities, linear production technologies, and indivisible goods and a finite number of agents. This class contains several well-known economies with indivisible goods and money as special cases. It is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indivisible commodities, if each agent initially own...
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作者：McKelvey, RD; Page, T
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Brown University
摘要：We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the ...
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作者：Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
作者单位：Bocconi University; Princeton University
摘要：We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, a...
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作者：Karni, E; Safra, Z
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The analysis of the behavioral and social implications of the intensity of moral sentiments requires that these emotions be quantified. In this paper we quantify the intensity of the individual sense of fairness in the context of the model of Karni and Safra [2001, Econometrica, forthcoming], That model depicts self-interest-seeking individuals endowed with an intrinsic sense of fairness, who must choose among alternative random allocation procedures to determine who. among a group of eligible...
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作者：Gilboa, I; Schmeidler, D; Wakker, PP
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper provides two axiomatic derivations of a case-based decision rule. Each axiomatization shows that, if preference orders over available acts in various contexts satisfy certain consistency requirements, then these orders can be numerically represented by maximization of a similarity-weighted utility function. In each axiomatization, both the similarity function and the utility function are simultaneously derived from preferences, and the axiomatic derivation also suggests a way to eli...
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作者：Gollier, C
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We consider an economy a la Lucas (1978, Econometrica 46, 1429-1446) with a risk-averse representative agent. The exogenous growth rate of the economy follows a random walk. We characterize the set of utility functions for which it is efficient to discount more distant cash flows at a lower rate. The benchmark result is that, when the growth rate is almost surely nonnegative, the yield curve is decreasing if and only if relative risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. Relaxing the assumption ...
