Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, L; Peters, H; Storcken, T
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2829
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 408-434
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; probabilistic decision schemes

摘要

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences oil the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterisation of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice 35 (1980), 437-455). Thereby. the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).