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作者：Bhaskar, V; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：University of Essex; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We provide a theoretical foundation for the use of Markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves. If admissible strategies must display Finite (arbitrarily long) memory and each player incurs a complexity cost which depends on the memory length required by her strategy, then every Nash equilibrium must be in Markovian strategies. If, in addition, admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory, every rationalizable strategy must be Markovian. These results are robust to consi...
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作者：Serizawa, S
作者单位：Tohoku University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In his pioneering article, (in Decision and Organization (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297-336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this article, we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods. We ...
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作者：Safra, Z; Segal, U
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Boston College
摘要：This note shows that M. J. Machina's (1982, Econometrica 50, 277 323) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Frechet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies, among other things, that decision makers buy full insurance only at the absence of marginal loading. We also show that with constant absolute and relative risk aversion, expe...
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作者：Norman, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In cont...
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作者：Tröger, T
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie f...
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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Moulin (J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999), 41-72) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note we give a straightforward proof of his result. Journal of Economics Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D70. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Gajdos, T; Tallon, JM
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Oechssler, J; Riedel, F
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Jackson, MO; Watts, A
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
摘要：We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals. The payoff to an individual from an economic or social activity depends on the network of connections among individuals. Over time individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement that the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. In addition to intended changes in the network there is a small probability of unintended changes or...
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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; University of Southampton
摘要：A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to t...
