Strategic complements, substitutes, and ambiguity: The implications for public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2898
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 436-466
• 关键词: Ambiguity; Strategic complements; public goods; Choquet integral; free rider

摘要

We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good. Journal of Economic Literature C72, D81, H41. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).