Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, L
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2813
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 298-317
• 关键词: Maximal domain; house allocation; coalitional strategy-proofness

摘要

We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preference on which efficancy and coalitional strategygy-proofness are compatible, A preferenc relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining house. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78. D63, D71. (C) 2001 Elsevier science (USA).