The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2959
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 490-499
• 关键词: Disagreement; bargaining

摘要

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).