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作者：Maruta, T
作者单位：Osaka Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper studies a stochastic equilibrium selection model for binary coordination games, Players switch strategies stochastically so that the mistake probabilities a re fully dependent on the Population states, A probabilistic behavior is said to be aspiration (imitation, resp.) oriented if strategy switches are mainly driven by the aspiration (imitation, resp.) effect. In general, a strategy switch by one player generates externalities on others. Strategies in a coordination game can be cla...
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作者：Dutta, B; Peters, H; Sen, A
作者单位：Maastricht University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of rep...
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作者：Mitra, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. (C) 2002 El...
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作者：Moreno, D; Wooders, J
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Arizona; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading pat trier is costly, prices arc determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero. even though the trading p...
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作者：Squintani, F; Välimäki, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Southampton
摘要：This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succ...
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作者：Tadenuma, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This paper formalizes two different principles to socially rank allocations under efficiency-equity trade off. The efficiency-first social preference relation ranks an allocation x higher than an allocation y if and only if (i) x is Pareto-superior to y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equity-superior to y. The equity-first social preference relation reverses the order of application of the two criteria, We show that the efficiency-first relation may have a cycle, whereas the ...
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作者：Datta, M; Mirman, LJ; Reffett, KL
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Virginia
摘要：In this paper, we provide a set of sufficient conditions under which recursive competitive equilibrium exists and is unique for a large class of distorted dynamic equilibrium models with capital and elastic labor supply. We develop a lattice based approach to the problem. The class of economics for which we are able to obtain our existence and uniqueness result is considerably larger than those considered in previous work. We conclude by applying the new results to some important examples of m...
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作者：Balder, EJ
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory 24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and gen...
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作者：Kübler, F; Chiappori, PA; Ekeland, I; Polemarchakis, HM
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Chicago; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Brown University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ewerhart, C
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n-1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies-regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
