Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baliga, S; Morris, S
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2855
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 450-468
• 关键词: Incomplete information; Nash equilibrium; Bayesian equilibrium; cheap talk

摘要

We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).