Optimal taxation in life-cycle economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erosa, A; Gervais, M
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Queens University - Canada; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2877
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 338-369
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; uniform taxation; life cycle

摘要

We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income, The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual's lifetime. One way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. If tax rates cannot be conditioned on age, a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal, as it can (imperfectly) mimic age-conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).