-
作者：Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains ...
-
作者：Barelli, Paulo
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Heifetz and Neeman [A. Heifetz, Z. Neeman, On the generic (im)possibility of full surplus extraction, Econometrica 74 (2006) 213-233], using convex combinations of models, showed that full surplus extraction (FSE) in mechanism design is generically impossible, contrary to the seminal work of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 53 (1988) 345-361]. Since Cremer and McLean did not allow convex combination...
-
作者：Meirowitz, Adam; Shotts, Kenneth W.
作者单位：Princeton University; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small....
-
作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all ...
-
作者：Li, Jing
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I construct a state space model with unawareness following [R.J. Aumann, Agreeing to disagree, Ann. Stat. 76 (1976) 1236-1239]. Dekel et al. [E. Dekel, B.L. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Standard state-space models preclude unawareness, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] show that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result by endowing the agent with a subjective state space: that differs from the full state space when he has the ...
-
作者：Crutzen, Benoit S. Y.; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856-869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225-239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive ...
-
作者：Rogers, Brian W.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestima...
-
作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Vienna
摘要：Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 4 (1973) 295-300], Rashid [S. Rashid, Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: Asymptotic results, Econ. Letters 12 (1983) 7-10], Mas-Colell [A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem by Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ. 13 (1984) 201-206], Khan and Sun [M. Khan, Y. Sun, Non-cooperative games on hyp...
-
作者：Keenan, Donald C.; Snow, Arthur
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In this paper, we advance a definition of greater downside risk aversion that applies to both large and small changes in risk preference, and thereby complements the results for small changes reported previously. We show that a downside risk-averse transformation of a utility function results in a function that is more downside risk averse in the same manner that a risk-averse transformation increases risk aversion. Our demonstration is conducted first by using the compensated approach introdu...
-
作者：Dubra, Juan; Echenique, Federico; Manelli, Alejandro M.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universidad de Montevideo; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economics with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economics. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
