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作者：Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; University of Leicester
摘要：We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity-in all of these, types other than the lowest participating ...
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作者：Ennis, Huberto M.; Keister, Todd
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation [E.J. Green, P. Lin, Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these cases, the mechanism also admits an equ...
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作者：Eeckhoudt, Louis; Schlesinger, Harris; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; IESEG School of Management; INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School
摘要：Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable (X) over tilde (i) dominates (Y) over tilde (i) via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M, N. We show that the 50-50 lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M)] dominates the lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M) via (N + M)th-order stochastic dominance. The basic...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise ...
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作者：Kikuchi, Tomoo; Stachurski, John
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Kyoto University
摘要：We study a two-country version of Matsuyama's [K. Matsuyama, Financial market globalization, symmetry-breaking, and endogenous inequality of nations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 853-884] world economy model. As in Matsuyama's model, symmetry-breaking can be observed, and symmetry-breaking generates endogenously determined levels of inequality. In addition, we show that when the countries differ in population size, their interaction through credit markets may lead to persistent endogenous fluctuatio...
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作者：Higashi, Youichiro; Hyogo, Kazuya; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Hosei University; Ryukoku University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time. For this purpose, we formulate an infinite horizon extension of [E. Dekel, B. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space, Econometrica 69 (2001) 891-934], and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those ab...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modeled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general Likelihood Compatibility axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs and characterize its implications for the class of invariant bisepa...
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作者：Galenianos, Manolis; Kircher, Philipp
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not co...
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作者：Garleanu, Nicolae
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies portfolio choice and pricing in markets in which immediate trading may be impossible. It departs from the literature by removing restrictions on asset holdings, and finds that optimal positions depend significantly and naturally on liquidity: When expected future liquidity is high, agents take more extreme positions, given that they do not have to hold those positions for long when they become undesirable. Consequently, larger trades should be observed in markets with more f...
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作者：Do, Quy-Toan; Levchenko, Andrei A.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogeneously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when ...
