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作者：Lo, Kin Chung
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler's [I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generalization of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that it d...
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作者：Ohanian, Lee E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Herbert Hoover. I develop a theory of labor market failure for the Depression based on Hoover's industrial labor program that provided industry with protection from unions in return for keeping nominal wages fixed. I find that the theory accounts for much of the depth of the Depression and for the asymmetry of the depression across sectors. The theory also can reconcile why deflation/low nominal spending apparently had such large real effects during the 1930s, but not during other periods of s...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Bonn
摘要：A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal. We discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex-ante social welfare. We first show that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows. At random, one agent at a time is selected to acquire informat...
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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price and the second-price auctions to the first-order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; thereby formally establishing t...
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作者：Fadel, Ronald; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be truthful (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasilinear in such transfers). For Bayesian incentive compatibility, the protocol may need to hide some information from the agents to pre...
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作者：Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A type structure is non-redundant if no two types of a player represent the same hierarchy of beliefs over the given set of basic uncertainties, and it is redundant otherwise. Under a mild necessary and sufficient condition termed separativity, we show that any redundant structure can be identified with a non-redundant structure with an extended space of basic uncertainties. The belief hierarchies induced by the latter structure, when marginalized, coincide with those induced by the former. We...
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作者：Deb, Rahul
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences, where an individual's consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers. We assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers. It is known that the general consumption model with externalities imposes few restrictions on the observed data, where the consistency requirement is Nash rationalizability. We motivate potential games as an important sub class of games where the...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and g...
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作者：Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for ...
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作者：McQuillin, Ben
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a partition function outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations (generalization and extension) obtains a unique...
