On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1320-1332
• 关键词: Full surplus extraction; mechanism design; Universal beliefs space; common knowledge

摘要

Heifetz and Neeman [A. Heifetz, Z. Neeman, On the generic (im)possibility of full surplus extraction, Econometrica 74 (2006) 213-233], using convex combinations of models, showed that full surplus extraction (FSE) in mechanism design is generically impossible, contrary to the seminal work of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 53 (1988) 345-361]. Since Cremer and McLean did not allow convex combinations of models, the two results are not comparable. We show that FSE is generically impossible when convex combinations of models are not allowed, provided that we do not hold fixed the cardinality of models. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.