Size approval voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1187-1210
• 关键词: Approval voting; characterization

摘要

We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting procedures is characterized by a set of natural properties. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.