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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：Brock University
摘要：A new approach to asymmetric first price auctions is proposed which circumvents the need to examine bidding strategies directly. Specifically, the ratio of bidders' (endogenous) payoffs is analyzed and compared to the ratio of the (exogenous) distribution functions that describe beliefs. Most of the results are inferred from this comparison. In the existing theoretical literature, assumptions of first order stochastic dominance or stronger imply that the latter ratio has very specific properti...
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作者：Bag, Parimal Kanti; Sabourian, Hamid; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：University of Cambridge; National University of Singapore; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequent...
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作者：Kesten, Onur
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider the problem of randomly assigning it indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior efficiency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priority. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gale's celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with the exception of the present context) thanks to their outstanding efficiency features. We present an ...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We offer a parsimonious definition of large population potential games, provide some alternate characterizations, and demonstrate the advantages of the new definition over the existing definition, but also show the equivalence of the two definitions. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Figueroa, Nicolas; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; New York University
摘要：This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions when buyers' outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller. We show that the revenue-maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats. Depending on the shape of outside options, sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex-post efficient way, and, other times, buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient. (C...
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作者：Momi, Takeshi
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：We demonstrate that information on the aggregate excess demand function of an incomplete real asset market economy is not helpful toward predicting the equilibrium of a new economy to which unredundant assets are added. An innovation of assets can completely change the aggregate excess demand functions. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Klibanoff, Peter; Marinacci, Massimo; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Northwestern University; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in [P. Klibanoff, M. Marinacci, S. Mukerji, A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity, Econometrica 73 (6) (2005) 1849-1892]. A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. In applications one may thus specify/var...
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作者：Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. We characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that, under this contract, the agent's utility converges to its lower bound-immiserization occurs. Unlike under risk-neutrality, the wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and a low-productivity ag...
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作者：Hansen, Gary D.; Imrohoroglu, Selahattin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effects of on-the-job skill accumulation on average hours worked by age and the volatility of hours over the life cycle in a calibrated general equilibrium model. Two forms of skill accumulation are considered: learning by doing and on-the-job training. In our economy with learning by doing, individuals supply more labor early in the life cycle and less as they approach retirement than they do in an economy without this feature. The impact of this feature on the volatility of hour...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Postl, Peter
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Two agents must select one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings are commonly known and diametrically opposed. Efficiency requires choosing the alternative the agents rank second whenever the weighted sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities is higher than under either agent's favorite alternative. The agents' utilities of the middle-ranked alternative are i.i.d., privately observed random variables. In our setup, which is closely related to a public goods problem where agents fa...
