Pivots versus signals in elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meirowitz, Adam; Shotts, Kenneth W.
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 744-771
• 关键词: Elections; INFORMATION; Pivot; signaling; voting

摘要

We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small. We investigate which effect - pivot or signaling drives equilibrium voting behavior in large electorates. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.