-
作者：Stokey, Nancy L.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：The substantial adjustment cost for housing affects nondurable consumption and portfolio allocations, as well as the frequency of housing transactions. A simple theoretical model, roughly calibrated, is used to assess the quantitative impact of adjustment costs on those decisions. The impact on portfolios is found to be significant, suggesting that housing wealth should be useful in empirical Studies of portfolio choice. The welfare loss from the transaction cost is also substantial. The effec...
-
作者：D'Agostino, Marcello; Dardanoni, Valentino
作者单位：University of Palermo; University of Ferrara
摘要：In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring social mobility when the social status of individuals is given by their rank. In order to sensibly represent the rank mobility of subgroups within a given society, we address the problem in terms of partial permutation matrices which include standard (global) matrices as a special case. We first provide a characterization of a partial ordering on partial matrices which, in the standard case of global matrices, coincides with the well-known ...
-
作者：Marcet, Albert; Scott, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy anti it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other Variables and it increases in response to shocks that Cause a higher deficit. Data fo...
-
作者：Houy, Nicolas
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：In a recent article, [S. Goyal, F. Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007) 460-492] the authors (GVR) showed the importance of stars and cycles in a given network formation game. Implicitly, in their article, a network is called an equilibrium if it is generated by an equilibrium strategy. We extend the results of GVR to the case of a stronger requirement: namely, that a network can be called an equilibrium only if all the strategies generating it are ...
-
作者：Ohanian, Lee E.; Prescott, Edward C.; Stokey, Nancy L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This introduces the symposium on dynamic general equilibrium. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Carmona, Guilherme
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin [P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin, The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, 1: Theory, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 1-26] and that it is neither implied nor...
-
作者：Cho, Seok-ju; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester; Yale University
摘要：We give it game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics, We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay,...
-
作者：Dellis, Arnaud
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account, namely, strategic voting, endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates. We consider two classes of voting rules. One class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally-weighed votes for the different candidates. The other class consists of the voting rules where each vo...
-
作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Arizona
摘要：The motivation of decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based reciprocity, or the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti, Psychological games and sequential rationality, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 60-79] point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their too...
-
作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：I characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus. The numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference. These expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation, perfectionism, context effects, and other phenomena. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.
