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作者：Obara, Ichiro
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some ...
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作者：Gaertner, Dennis L.; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and we investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn i...
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作者：Houy, Nicolas; Tadenuma, Koichi
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the Mth binary relation. We show several distinct sets ...
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作者：Benaim, Michel; Hofbauer, Josef; Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of Neuchatel; University of Vienna
摘要：We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on recent experience, the time average of play often converges in these unstable games, even while mixed strategies and beliefs continue to cycle. This time average, the TASP, is...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Hoerner, Johannes
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yale University
摘要：We consider a simple variant of the canonical model of social learning and show that in many Situations it is optimal for an agent to abandon her own information and follow the minority rather than the majority. This possibility depends on two economically meaningful requirements: agents are differentially informed and observe only the number of agents having chosen each option, such as consumers observing only market shares. We show that minority wisdom arises when information is sufficiently...
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作者：Martinez, Leonardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the po...
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作者：Bond, Philip; Gomes, Armando
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal-agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent's indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We identify a new source of allocational inefficiency across tasks: excessive concentration, and its cons...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We discuss the theory of gerrymandering-proof voting rules. Our approach is axiomatic. We show that, for votes over a binary set of alternatives, any rule that is unanimous, anonymous, and gerrymandering-proof must decide a social outcome as a function of the proportions of agents voting for each alternative, and must either be independent of this proportion, or be in one-to-one correspondence with the proportions. In an extended model in which the outcome of a vote at the district level can b...
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作者：Chiesa, Gabriella; Denicolo, Vincenzo
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is P...
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作者：Koulovatianos, Christos; Mirman, Leonard J.; Santugini, Marc
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Virginia; University of Vienna
摘要：We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the effect of risk generated by the planner's econometric activity on optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two sources of risk about future payoffs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty due to the anticipation of learning. The latter renders control and learning nonseparable. We present two sets of results in a learning environment. First, conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or de...
