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作者：Kovac, Eugen; Mylovanov, Tymofiy
作者单位：University of Bonn; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent R Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal delegation (e.g., [Bengt Holmstrom, On the theory of delegation, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland, 1984, pp. 115-141]): a principal-agent model with hidden...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying...
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作者：Lamy, Laurent
摘要：The analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism. For the General Symmetric Model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (1982) 1089-1122] we characterize the full set of separating equilibria that are symmetric among buyers and with a strategic seller being able to bid in the same way as any buyer through a so-called sh...
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作者：Milgrom, Paul; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Stanford University
摘要：This paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis. Weak substitutes, the usual price-theory notion, guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only strong substitutes, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, that the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and that the law of aggregate demand is satisf...
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作者：Green, Edward J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：An analytically tractable model of a competitive, full-information economy is provided in which, for some parameter values, entry and exit over the course of the business cycle is concentrated among small firms. This model is intended to make the logical point that the relatively high sensitivity of small firms to business-cycle fluctuations does not necessarily indicate the presence of informational or incentive constraints in financial markets. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Pablo Rincon-Zapatero, Juan; Santos, Manuel S.
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Miami
摘要：This paper studies first-order differentiability properties of the value function in concave dynamic programs. Motivated by economic considerations, we dispense with commonly imposed interiority assumptions. We suppose that the correspondence of feasible choices varies with the vector of state variables, and we allow the optimal solution to belong to the boundary of this correspondence. Under minimal assumptions we prove that the value function is continuously differentiable. We then discuss t...
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作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Lauwers, Luc; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University
摘要：The unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a regressive transfer in income-a transfer from worse-off (poor) to better-off (rich)-decreases social welfare. In a multidimensional setting the direct link between income (or any other attribute) and individual well-being is absent. We interpret the social welfare level of a distribution in which each individual has the same bundle as the individual wellbeing level. We define regressivity on the basis of this individual well-bei...
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作者：Martimort, David; Stole, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution schedules. We prove that under complete information, payoff vectors of equilibria with truthful schedules coincide with the set of smooth equilibrium payoffs, including non-truthful schedules. We next consider whether the presence of arbitrarily small amounts of asymmetric information is enough to refine this payoff set. Providing that the extensions of the eq...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：The experimental literature on time preference finds that the manner in which subjects discount money (as opposed to utility) exhibits properties known as Decreasing Impatience and the Magnitude Effect. While these findings are often referred to as anomalies for the Exponential Discounting model, several authors have demonstrated that each of these qualitative findings can be explained by the curvature of utility and thus are not anomalies. We prove that, under basic regularity conditions, the...
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作者：Degan, Arianna; Merlo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically closest to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple el...
