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作者：Loisel, Olivier
摘要：We consider a broad class of linear dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models made of a finite number N of structural equations for N + 1 endogenous variables and to be closed by one policy feedback rule. We design, for any model of this class and any stationary VARMA solution of that model, a bubble-free policy feedback rule ensuring that this solution is not only the unique stationary solution of the closed model, but also its unique solution. We apply these results to locally linearis...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Yang, Chih-Chun
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Rochester; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability) to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. ...
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作者：Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Iowa
摘要：The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Martin, Alberto
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are m...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Yonsei University; Columbia University
摘要：We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may, collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction - i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free, environment - can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are mu...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (L) over cap (n, p) satisfies (L) over cap (n, p) <= (L) over cap (n, left perpendicular/2right perpendicular) <= 4/3 root n. If p/n is bounded away from 1/2, (L) over cap (n, p) converges to zero exponentially in n. Participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achie...
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作者：Desmet, Klaus; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Princeton University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Between 1970 and 2000 employment growth across U.S. counties exhibited very different patterns in manufacturing and services. Whereas manufacturing employment growth was negatively related to initial manufacturing employment across the entire distribution of counties, service employment growth was positively related to initial service employment for intermediate sized counties. This paper presents a theory to rationalize these facts. Local sectoral growth is driven by technological diffusion a...
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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Vienna
摘要：We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence...
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作者：Diecidue, Enrico; Schmidt, Ulrich; Zank, Horst
作者单位：University of Manchester; INSEAD Business School; University of Kiel; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：This paper provides preference foundations for parametric weighting functions under rank-dependent utility. This is achieved by decomposing the independence axiom of expected utility into separate meaningful properties. These conditions allow us to characterize rank-dependent utility with power and exponential weighting functions. Moreover, by allowing probabilistic risk attitudes to vary within the probability interval, a preference foundation for rank-dependent utility with parametric invers...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his opponent's policy is preferred by all voters. The departure from the Downsian prediction is most pronounced when candidates have a weak policy preference and care mostly about winning the election. In that cas...
