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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We examine the role of off-path superstitions in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence th...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper extends [R. Mehra, E.C. Prescott, Recursive competitive equilibrium: The case of homogeneous households, Econometrica 48 (1980) 1365-1380] to a production economy with two capital goods. It is an RBC model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea, an 'option.' When options are scarce, new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises. Thus the stock market and Tobin's Q are negative indexes of intangibles. During a boom, Q rises gradually, as optio...
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作者：Mortensen, Dale T.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Aarhus University
摘要：A plausible micro foundation for the matching function, postulated in models of equilibrium unemployment, is proposed. The flow of matches formed is an increasing and concave function of the number of jobs and workers to be matched holding the other constant, but exhibits increasing to scale. Nevertheless, the function is consistent with the observed Beveridge curve and the log linear relationship between the job finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Although a market equilibrium in...
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作者：Rogerson, Richard; Wallenius, Johanna
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work. We find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work. Moreover, we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers. In our model, micro and macro elasticities are effe...
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作者：Labadie, Pamela
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：Adverse selection economies with private information are generally studied under the assumption that contracts are exclusive. That is, retrading is prohibited. An alternative market mechanism, the anonymous mechanism, is studied here. Risk averse agents trade contingent claims directly and side markets are in equilibrium. The result is the anonymous equilibrium. The anonymous equilibrium results in a set of endogenous transfers and subsidies. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Garcia, Diego; Vanden, Joel M.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the formation of mutual funds by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework. In our model, informed agents set up mutual funds as a means of selling their private information to uninformed agents. We study the case of imperfect competition among fund managers, where uninformed agents invest simultaneously in multiple mutual funds. The size of the assets under management in the mutual fund industry is determined by endogenizing the agents' information a...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Experiments on static intertemporal choice find evidence of particularly extreme impatience toward immediate rewards. While this is often taken as support for hyperbolic discounting, it could also arise because the most likely participants in experiments may be those with the most immediate need for money. We conduct a calibration exercise and find that the extreme impatience observed in experiments can be accommodated by a standard exponential discounting model with no discounting and expecta...
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作者：Amoros, Pablo
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga
摘要：A jury must provide a ranking of contestants (students applying for scholarships or Ph.D. programs, gymnasts in a competition, etc.). There exists a true ranking which is common knowledge among the jurors, but is not verifiable. The socially optimal rule is that the contestants be ranked according to the true ranking. The jurors are partial and, for example, may have friends (contestants that they would like to benefit) and enemies (contestants that they would like to prejudice). We study nece...
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作者：Barlo, Mehmet; Carmona, Guilherme; Sabourian, Hamid
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Sabanci University; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1-memory strategies. We establish the following in games with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1-memory. Second, for arbitrary level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported with 1-memory if the number of players exceeds two. Furthermore, in t...
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作者：McGrattan, Ellen R.; Prescott, Edward C.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：In this paper, we extend the growth model to include firm-specific technology capital and use it to assess the gains from opening to foreign direct investment. A firm's technology capital is its unique know-how from investing in research and development, brands, and organization capital. Technology capital is distinguished from other forms of capital in that a firm can use it simultaneously in multiple domestic and foreign locations. A country can exploit foreign technology capital by permitti...
