English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dubra, Juan; Echenique, Federico; Manelli, Alejandro M.
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Universidad de Montevideo; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 825-849
• 关键词: Auction theory; international trade; monotone comparative statics; Global univalence

摘要

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economics with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economics. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.