-
作者：Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Ruediger
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Universitat Siegen
摘要：In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem humans and other species compete for land and prey biomass. Each submodel exhibits a price-driven competitive allocation mechanism, and the endogenously determined habitat is either openly accessible or privately owned. In both scenarios specific corrective taxes or subsidies are needed to internalize ecosystem externalities. An open access habitat causes additional inefficiencies through diverging prices for b...
-
作者：Rodrigues-Neto, Jose Alvaro
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We present new necessary and sufficient conditions for checking if a set of players' posteriors may come from a common prior. A simple diagrammatic device calculates the join and meet of players' knowledge partitions. Each cycle in the diagram has a corresponding cycle equation. Posteriors are consistent with a common prior if and only if all cycle equations are satisfied. We prove that in games of two players, where the join partition has only singletons, a common prior exists if each player'...
-
作者：Barillas, Francisco; Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago
摘要：Reinterpreting most of the market price of risk as a price of model uncertainty eradicates a link between asset prices and measures of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations that was proposed by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini [17], Tallarini [30], Alvarez and Jermann [1]. Prices of model uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty, not the consumption fluctuations that Lucas [22,23] studied. A max-min expected utility theory lets us reinterpret Tallari...
-
作者：Goltsman, Maria; Hoerner, Johannes; Pavlov, Gregory; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Brescia; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We compare three common dispute resolution processes - negotiation, mediation, and arbitration - in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]. Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the pat-ties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to ...
-
作者：Amarante, Massimiliano
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study an axiomatic model of preferences, which contains as special cases Subjective Expected Utility, Choquet Expected Utility, Maxmin and Maxmax Expected Utility and many other models. First, we give a complete characterization of the class of functionals representing these preferences. Then, we show that any such functional can be represented as a Choquet integral I(f) = integral kappa(f)d nu where kappa : B(Sigma) -> A (C) is the canonical mapping from the space of bounded Sigma-measurab...
-
作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Celik, Gorkem
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is partly informed of the agent's type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces the principal's payoff compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition on the distribution of the agen...
-
作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Phelan, Christopher
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent's private type, we assume that the planner/government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism. We model the planner/government as having ...
-
作者：Farmer, Roger E. A.; Waggoner, Daniel F.; Zha, Tao
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Emory University
摘要：We develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be determinate in a class of forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models and we develop an algorithm to check these conditions in practice. We use three examples, based on the new-Keynesian model of monetary policy, to illustrate our technique. Our work connects applied econometric models of Markov-switching with forward looking rational expectations models and allows an applied researcher to construct ...
-
作者：Hong, Lu; Page, Scott
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Private information is typically modeled as signals. A joint probability distribution captures relationships between signals and between signals and relevant variables. In this paper, we define and contrast two types of signals: generated and interpreted. We demonstrate that even though the standard assumption of conditional independence is a reasonable benchmark assumption for generated signals, it imposes a specific, and unlikely structure on interpreted signals. We also show that independen...
