Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rogers, Brian W.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Camerer, Colin F.
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1440-1467
• 关键词: Experimental economics; game theory; Cognitive hierarchy; Quantal response equilibrium; bounded rationality

摘要

We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestimating others' responsiveness. We show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of Truncated QRE. We conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches. We find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice, and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.