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作者：Chen, Wanyi
作者单位：Xiamen University
摘要：This paper studies the optimal inference from observing an ongoing experiment. An experimenter sequentially chooses whether to continue with costly trials that yield random payoffs. The experimenter sees the full history of the trial results, while an outside observer sees only the recent trial results, not the earlier prehistory. I contrast the optimal sophisticated posterior of the observer based on a full Bayesian inference that accounts for the prehistory and the naive posterior based sole...
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作者：Guo, Liang
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Revealed preferences between lotteries can be asymmetrically reversed across choice and valuation. The ongoing debate is whether the procedure-invariance principle is violated. This research presents a parsimonious theory to reconcile asymmetric preference reversals with procedure invariance. When risk attitude is ex ante imperfectly known, preference-eliciting procedures can endogenously influence revealed preferences through affecting the incentive for information retrieval/acquisition (i.e....
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We analyze the effect of handicaps on turnout. A handicap is a difference in the vote tally between alternatives that is added to the vote tally generated by voters. Handicaps are implicit in many existing democratic procedures. Within a costly voting framework with private values we show that turnout incentives diminish considerably across the board if handicaps are large, while low handicaps yield more mixed predictions. The results extend beyond the baseline model-e.g. by including uncertai...
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作者：Shichijo, Tatsuhiro; Fukuda, Emiko
作者单位：Osaka Metropolitan University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：Excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have similar coordination problems. In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate coordination mechanisms for both types of goods. We employ the equal cost-sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism, which has been studied for excludable public goods with non-rivalry. We find that the mechanism is optimal regarding two welfare criteria in an environment with generalized non-rivalry...
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作者：Calcagno, Riccardo; Heider, Florian
作者单位：Polytechnic University of Turin; European Central Bank; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the role of stock market characteristics on managerial compensation. A risk averse manager exerts an unobservable effort that drives future firm value. The value cannot be used in the incentive contract because it realizes in the distant future and compensating the manager cannot be postponed until then. The stock price emerges endogenously because of trading by informed and uninformed traders in a standard competitive noisy rational expectations equilibrium model. We identify new ski...
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作者：Orzach, Roi
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：McAfee (1995) proposes a model of price dispersion with multiproduct firms. Theorem 7 in McAfee (1995) incorrectly characterizes one class of equilibria in this setting, constant profits equilibria. I provide a counterexample to this theorem and show that two main features McAfee (1995) emphasizes are still true: such equilibria can exist with more than two products but cannot exist if the number of products tends to infinity. (C) 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dam, Kaniska; Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We examine interactions between multiple bank-loan officer-borrower hierarchies. Possibility of collusion between the borrower and the loan officer(s) in charge of monitoring shapes incentives for the loan officers. When 'borrower quality is low', collusive threats induce over-monitoring in a collusion-free equilibrium, whereas for high borrower quality, monitoring is at its non-delegation level-an outcome akin to vertical integration. Under multiple-bank lending, delegation contracts may solv...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We study the use of mixed strategies in games by ambiguity averse agents with a preference for ran-domization. Applying the decision theoretic model of Saito (2015) to games, we establish that the set of rationalizable strategies grows larger as preference for randomization weakens. An agent's preference for randomization is partially observable: given the behavior of an agent in a game, we can determine an upper bound on the strength of randomization preference for that agent. Notably, data i...
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作者：Chung, Kim-Sau; Liu, Erica Meixiazi; Lo, Melody
作者单位：Hong Kong Baptist University; Duke University
摘要：This paper studies how sellers behave when their consumers have difficulty in detecting small differences. These consumers pose a problem because, even if a good deal exists, they cannot appreciate it if it is barely better than their outside options. This creates a role for a second deal, either marketed by the same seller or by another seller, even when consumers are homogeneous in their tastes. If the same seller markets the second deal, it will strategically position the first as a good de...
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作者：Balmaceda, Felipe
作者单位：Universidad Andres Bello
摘要：This paper studies the cost and benefits of private and public communication in a game with a pol-icy maker, a privately-informed expert, and the public. The policy maker and the expert have different opinions/views about the state of the world and both the expert and policy maker care about the expert's reputation with the public. The amount of information acquisition and transmission under private vs. public communication, depends on how much the policy maker and the expert differ in opinion...
