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作者：Bils, Peter; Duggan, John; Judd, Gleason
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University; University of Rochester; University of Rochester; Princeton University
摘要：We study a model of repeated elections that features privately informed politicians and ideologically extreme lobby groups. We establish existence of a class of perfect Bayesian equilibria. If office incentives are high, then all equilibria feature strong parties: liberal politicians all choose the same policy, as do all conservative politicians. When the effectiveness of money approaches zero, these equilibrium policies converge to the median, providing a dynamic version of the median voter t...
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作者：Bahel, Eric
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：For the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce and study the notion of hyperadditivity, a new cohesiveness property weaker than convexity and stronger than superadditivity. It is first established that every hyperadditive game is balanced: we propose a formula allowing to compute some core allocations; and this leads to the definition of a single-valued solution that satisfies core selection for hyperadditive games. This new solution coincides with the Shapley value...
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作者：Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive mixed bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. We examine both a firm's incentive to introduce mixed bundling and equilibrium tariffs when all firms adopt the mixed-bundling strategy. In the duopoly case, relative to separate sales, mixed bundling has ambiguous impacts on prices, profit and consumer surplus; with many firms, however, mixed bundling typically lowers all prices, harms firms and benefits consumers. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc....
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作者：Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are self-destroying as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to possibly anot...
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作者：Magdalou, Brice
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; Universite de Montpellier; Institut Agro
摘要：This paper provides a generalization of the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya (HLP) Theorem in the following discrete framework: a distribution counts the number of persons having each possible individual outcome - assumed to be finitely divisible - and social welfare improving transfers have the structure of a discrete cone. The generalization is abstract in the sense that individual outcomes can be unidimensional or multidimensional, each dimension can be cardinal or ordinal and no further specificatio...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：We propose a model where banks with limited liability issue deposits backed by capital, and households demand deposits and currency as means-of-payments for decentralized trades. When financial friction is severe or productivity is low, banks hold excess reserves in equilibrium with a low nominal interest rate, and with capital holdings above the efficient level. In that region, paying a positive interest on reserves financed by money creation is optimal. Under a fixed inflation target, optima...
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作者：Rondina, Giacomo; Walker, Todd B.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In the context of a dynamic model with incomplete information, we isolate a novel mechanism of shock propagation. We term the mechanism confounding dynamics because it arises from agents' optimal signal extraction efforts on variables whose dynamics-as opposed to super-imposed noise-prevents full revelation of information. Employing methods in the space of analytic functions, we are able to obtain analytical characterizations of the equilibria that generalize the celebrated Hansen-Sargent opti...
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作者：Dutta, Prajit K.
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：This paper considers a new model of repeated bargaining over a flow. In Rubinstein (1982), once an agreement is reached the game ends. Here, the game continues and the agreement can be re-negotiated at cost in any period. It is shown that, with finite memory, there is a unique equilibrium which converges to the Nash Bargaining Solution in the limit. The novel equilibrium feature is the search for compromise; players reject agreements that give them too much. Whilst rejection and delays are nev...
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作者：Borovicka, Jaroslav; Stachurski, John
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Australian National University
摘要：We obtain an exact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium asset prices in infinite horizon, discrete-time, arbitrage free environments. Using local spectral radius methods, we connect the condition, and hence the problem of existence and uniqueness of asset prices, with the recent literature on stochastic discount factor decompositions. Our results include a globally convergent method for computing prices whenever they exist. Convergence of this iter...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Imperial College London
摘要：Azevedo and Gottlieb (2017) (AG) define a notion of equilibrium that always exists in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS) model of competitive insurance markets, provided costs are bounded. However, equilibrium predictions are fragile: introducing an infinitesimal mass of high-cost individuals discretely increases all prices and reduces coverage for all individuals. We study sensitivity w.r.t. cost bounds by considering sequences of economies with increasing upper bounds of cost, and deter...
