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作者：Piermont, Evan
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：I propose a normative updating rule, extended Bayesianism, for the incorporation of probabilistic information arising from the process of becoming more aware. Extended Bayesianism generalizes standard Bayesian updating to allow the posterior to reside on richer probability space than the prior. I then provide a behavioral characterization of this rule to conclude that a decision maker's subjective expected utility beliefs are consistent with extended Bayesianism. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
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作者：Li, Yingkai; Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof ma...
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作者：Mangin, Sephorah; Julien, Benoit
作者单位：Australian National University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：When is entry efficient in markets with search and matching frictions? This paper generalizes the well-known Hosios condition to dynamic environments where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. Entry is efficient when buyers' surplus share is equal to the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity (i.e. the elasticity of the expected match surplus with respect to buyers). This ensures agents are paid for their contribution to both match creation and surplus creation. ...
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作者：Heumann, Tibor
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：There is a continuum of agents, each of whom trades a divisible asset via demand function competition. Individual valuations are determined by payoff shocks that are correlated across agents. Agents observe multi-dimensional signals about the payoff shocks; it is only assumed that the signals are normally and symmetrically distributed. We give three results about this economy. First, an equilibrium exists. Second, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient; a higher total surplus could be atta...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：The ever-increasing shortage of organs for transplantation has motivated many innovative policies to promote the supply of organs. This paper proposes and analyzes a general class of deceased organ allocation policies that assign priority on organ waiting lists to voucher holders to promote deceased donor registration. Priority vouchers can be obtained by self-registering for donation or through family inheritance. In an overlapping generations framework, we find that extending the donor prior...
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作者：Sethi, Rajiv
作者单位：Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：This paper considers finitely repeated games played by procedurally rational players, who sample their available alternatives and use realized payoffs as a basis for strategy selection. The corresponding solution concept is that of (payoff) sampling equilibrium, which is a distribution over strategies that is self-replicating under the sampling procedure. Sampling equilibria are rest points of a disequilibrium dynamic process, and stability with respect to this process can be used as an equili...
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作者：Saint-Paul, Gilles
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：Economists recommend to partly redistribute gains to losers from a structural reform, which in many cases may be required for making the reform politically viable. However, taxation is distortionary. Then, it is unclear that compensatory transfers can support a Pareto-improving reform. This paper provides sufficient conditions for this to occur, despite tax distortions. In a setting where preferences are isoelastic, deregulation is implementable in a Pareto-improving way through compensatory l...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando; Barlevy, Gadi
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：This paper examines whether forcing banks to disclose balance-sheet information that they choose not to reveal can improve welfare. We show mandatory disclosure can improve welfare when banks are vulnerable to contagion due to interconnectedness. In our benchmark model, mandatory disclosure is beneficial only if markets are frozen. When we modify the model to incorporate moral hazard, mandatory disclosure can also improve welfare in normal times, but only as long as there is some potential for...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey; Galeotti, Andrea; Jann, Ole; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; London Business School; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：A health authority chooses a binary action for each of several individuals that differ in their pretest probabilities of being infectious and in the additive losses associated with two types of decision errors. The authority is endowed with a portfolio of tests that differ in their sensitivities and specificities. We derive a simple necessary condition for optimality of test allocation. In special cases, precision parameters of the allocated test are monotone in the individuals' types. We char...
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作者：Fu, Hu; Haghpanah, Nima; Hartline, Jason; Kleinberg, Robert
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northwestern University; Cornell University
摘要：We study whether an auctioneer who has only partial knowledge of the distribution of buyers' valuations can extract the full surplus. There is a finite number of possible distributions, and the auctioneer has access to a finite number of samples (independent draws) from the true distribution. Full surplus extraction is possible if the number of samples is at least the difference between the number of distributions and the dimension of the linear space they span, plus one. This bound is tight. ...
