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作者：Hagen, Martin; Hernando-Veciana, Angel
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad; Durham University
摘要：A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch con...
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作者：Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek
作者单位：University of Messina; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich
摘要：We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environme...
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作者：Marchiori, Davide; Di Guida, Sibilla; Polonio, Luca
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern Denmark; IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Trento
摘要：We propose an experimental eye-tracking study to test how strategic sophistication is shaped by experience in 3x3 two-person normal-form games. Although strategic sophistication has been shown to be linked to a variety of endogenous and exogenous factors, little is known about how it is affected by previous interactive decisions. We show that complete feedback in previous games can significantly enhance strategic sophistication, and that games that in principle provide equivalent learning oppo...
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作者：Schummer, James
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Stochastically arriving objects (e.g. transplant organs, public housing units) often are allocated via waiting lists exhibiting deferral rights: agents may decline offers, keeping their position in line. We consider the welfare implications of bestowing or constraining such rights, concluding that their desirability depends-in opposite ways-on agents' risk-aversion and impatience. Under risk-aversion, uninfluenced deferral rights typically enhance welfare. Under discounting some restrictions o...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometricrules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts...
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作者：Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; University of York - UK
摘要：We propose a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. An agent (firm or worker) can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is bound by her commitment and cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. A free agent can make decisions independently. Every agent has preferences over multiple contracts and tries to find her best possible partner with a contract. We examine the problem of how to match...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We introduce a new theory of belief revision under ambiguity. It is recursive (random variables are evaluated by backward induction) and consequentialist (the conditional expectation of any random variable depends only on the values the random variable attains on the conditioning event). Agents experience no change in preferences but are sensitive to the timing of resolution of uncertainty. We provide three main theorems: the first characterizes our rule and relates it to standard Bayesian upd...
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作者：Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Warwick; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We study methods for constructing a story from partial evidence where a story is defined as a path along a finite directed graph from the origin to a terminal node. Each node in the graph represents a possible event. A story builder receives evidence, i.e. a subset of events consistent with at least one story, and expands it into a coherent story. The analysis focuses on a stickiness property whereby if the story builder believes in a particular story, given a certain set of facts, then he bel...
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作者：Grossmann, Volker; Larin, Benjamin; Loefflad, Hans Torben; Steger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Fribourg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; University College London; University of St Gallen; University of Zurich; Leipzig University; Leibniz Association; Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
摘要：The trajectories of real housing rents and real house prices have shown an upward sloping trend in most industrialized countries since WW2. The burden of rising housing rents is likely to be distributed unequally because income-poor households devote a larger share of their consumption expenditures on housing than income-rich households. This inverse relation between income and the expenditure share of housing is labeled Schwabe's law. We analyze how the dynamics in housing rents affect househ...
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作者：Baumann, Leonie; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Northwestern University
摘要：We explore the dynamics of demand for n designs of a good when agents have preferences for (anti-)conformity. Agents differ in their social status and each agent seeks to imitate those of higher status and to distinguish herself from those of lower status, relative to her own status. In each period, every agent chooses a design given each agent's demand in the previous period. We show that demand dynamics resemble fashion cycles: The demand for designs is repetitively bell-shaped over time, an...
