Contextual deliberation and the choice-valuation preference reversal

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guo, Liang
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105285
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: choice; deliberation; Preference reversal; Procedure invariance; valuation

摘要

Revealed preferences between lotteries can be asymmetrically reversed across choice and valuation. The ongoing debate is whether the procedure-invariance principle is violated. This research presents a parsimonious theory to reconcile asymmetric preference reversals with procedure invariance. When risk attitude is ex ante imperfectly known, preference-eliciting procedures can endogenously influence revealed preferences through affecting the incentive for information retrieval/acquisition (i.e., deliberation). As predicted, when lottery pairing was known, experiment participants exhibited substantially less asymmetric reversals by stating mean-preserving and more dispersed valuations. Therefore, the endogeneity of asymmetric preference reversals can be substantiated. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).