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作者：Echenique, Federico; Miralles, Antonio; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Messina; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible that Alice's envy of Bob's assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob's participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out justified envy, defined as envy for which a remedy...
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作者：Iong, Ka-Kit; Irmen, Andreas
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Declining hours of work per worker in conjunction with a growing work force may give rise to fluctuations between growth regimes. This is shown in an overlapping generations model with two-period lived individuals endowed with Boppart-Krusell preferences (Boppart and Krusell (2020)). On the supply side, economic growth is due to the expansion of consumption-good varieties through endogenous research. A sufficiently negative equilibrium elasticity of the individual supply of hours worked to an ...
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作者：de la Croix, David; Pommeret, Aude
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite Savoie Mont Blanc
摘要：Having children is like investing in a risky project. Postponing birth is like delaying an irreversible invest -ment. It has an option value, which depends on its costs and benefits, and in particular on the additional risks motherhood brings. We develop a parsimonious theory of childbearing postponement along these lines. We derive its implications for asset accumulation, income, optimal age at first birth, and childlessness. The structural parameters are estimated by matching the predictions...
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作者：Sadzik, Tomasz; Woolnough, Chris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper studies the effect of informed trading on prices in a dynamic model with two-dimensional private information. We show that a trader with private information about the asset's value and a persistent liquidity shock trades along with and exacerbates the shock. The price changes more than if the shock was unexpected. When shocks are small, the with-wind trade is so strong that the distribution of prices and asset holdings changes discontinuously from the stabilizing linear equilibrium ...
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作者：Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper establishes the existence of endogenous cycles in infinite-horizon open economy models with a flow collateral constraint. It shows that for plausible parameter configurations, the economy has a unique equilibrium exhibiting deterministic cycles in which periods of debt growth are followed by periods of debt deleveraging. In particular, three-period cycles exist, which implies by the Li-Yorke Theorem the presence of cycles of any periodicity and chaos. The paper also shows that deter...
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作者：Garcia, Daniel; Tsur, Matan
作者单位：University of Vienna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bristol
摘要：This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. We consider a regulator that assigns ratings to individuals according to their expected costs. Insurers observe these ratings and compete as in Akerlof (1970). The optimal rating system minimizes exante risk subject to participation constraints. We prove that in any such market there exists a unique optimal system under which all individuals trade and the ratings match low-cost t...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Georgiadis, George; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We study the joint determination of wages, effort, and training in apprenticeships where novices must work in order to learn. We introduce the idea of learning-by-doing as an inequality constraint, which allows masters to strategically slow training down. Every Pareto-efficient contract has an initial phase where the novice learns as fast as technologically feasible, followed by a phase where their master constrains how fast they learn. This latter phase mitigates the novice's commitment probl...
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作者：Karp, Larry; Sakamoto, Hiroaki
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Kobe University
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of international environmental agreements where countries cannot make long-term commitments or use sanctions or rewards to induce cooperation. The equilibrium is a Markov chain, not a particular coalition. A large and effective coalition is an absorbing state, reached after a random succession of short-lived ineffective coalitions. Reaching such a coalition requires that the endogenous probability of success in any negotiating round is neither too small nor too large...
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作者：Guarino, Pierfrancesco; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：University of Klagenfurt; Maastricht University
摘要：For a fixed game and a type structure that admits a common prior, Action Independence states that the conditional beliefs induced by the common prior do not depend on the players' own strategies. It has been conjectured that Action Independence can be behaviorally characterized by means of a suitable no-betting condition (Dekel and Siniscalchi, 2015), but whether this is indeed the case remains an open problem. In this paper, we prove this conjecture true by focusing on strategy-invariant bets...
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作者：Tsakas, Nikolas; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but voters may disagree on which alternative is the best match due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, electing the correct alternative is challenging. We show that multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lea...
