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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran; Thysen, Heidi C.
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study strategic communication when the sender's multi-dimensional messages are given an interpretation by the sender himself or by a proxy. Interpreting messages involves the provision of some data about their statistical state-dependence. Interpretation can be selective: different kinds of data interpret different sets of message components. The receiver uses this data to decipher messages, yet he does not draw any inferences from the kind of data he is given. In this way, strategic interp...
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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：I present an approach to static equilibrium modeling with non-rational expectations, which is based on enriching players' typology. A player is characterized by his data access, consisting of: (i) news access, which corresponds to a conventional signal in the Harsanyi model, and (ii) archival access, a novel component representing the player's piecemeal knowledge of steady-state correlations. Drawing on prior literature on correlation neglect and coarse reasoning, I assume the player extrapola...
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作者：Yokote, Koji
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：In a many-to-many variation of Kelso and Crawford's (1982) and Kojima et al.'s (2019) job-matching model, we prove that the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector satisfies a striking property termed con-sistency. It states that the price vector remains an equilibrium price vector in the market where an arbitrary doctor reduces her capacity by one. Combining consistency with Kojima et al.'s (2019) result, we delineate how the set of equilibrium price vectors moves when a doctor reduces her ca...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：A firm buys data from consumers to learn about some uncertain state of the world. There are data exter-nalities, whereby data of some consumers reveal information about other consumers' data. I characterize data externalities that maximize or minimize consumer surplus and the firm's profit. I use the result to solve an information design problem in which the firm chooses what information to buy from consumers, balanc-ing the value and price of information. The firm collects no less information...
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作者：von Wangenheim, Jonas
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectations-based loss aversion a la Koszegi and Rabin in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the reference point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of information crucially affects equilibrium behavior. Consequently, I show that-even with independent private values-the Vickrey auction yields strictly highe...
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作者：Yang, Kai Hao
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper characterizes the efficient market demands among those with a fixed surplus level in a multiproduct monopoly, where the monopolist is able to produce a continuum of quality-differentiated products with a cost function that is convex in quality. We show that any efficient market demand must be affineunit-elastic. This further reduces the problem of characterizing the efficient frontier to a finite dimensional constraint optimization problem. From this characterization, it follows tha...
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作者：Kikuchi, Tomoo; Nishimura, Kazuo; Stachurski, John; Zhang, Junnan
作者单位：Waseda University; Kobe University; Australian National University; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：We show that competitive equilibria in a range of models related to production networks can be recovered as solutions to dynamic programs. Although these programs fail to be contractive, we prove that they are tractable. As an illustration, we treat Coase's theory of the firm, equilibria in production chains with transaction costs, and equilibria in production networks with multiple partners. We then show how the same techniques extend to other equilibrium and decision problems, such as the di...
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作者：Laslier, Jean-Francois; Nunez, Matias; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nashimplementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for exten...
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作者：Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：Recently, a trend has developed around the world for referenda to be used to determine binary social decisions. In a couple of setups, we prove impossibility results of the following form: a binary social goal can be achieved via a referendum if and only if it is dictatorial. Hence, our results challenge the conventional wisdom in social choice theory that social decisions are permissive in two-outcome environments (May's Theorem). (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Haeringer, Guillaume; Iehle, Vincent
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Universite de Rouen Normandie
摘要：We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have the option to either finalize their matches or participate in the next period. Students participating in an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new rank order list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity among participants, like withdrawals. We identify the conditions under which ...
