Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balmaceda, Felipe
• 署名单位: Universidad Andres Bello
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105314
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Private and public communication; TRANSPARENCY; experts; non-common priors; reputation; ACCOUNTABILITY

摘要

This paper studies the cost and benefits of private and public communication in a game with a pol-icy maker, a privately-informed expert, and the public. The policy maker and the expert have different opinions/views about the state of the world and both the expert and policy maker care about the expert's reputation with the public. The amount of information acquisition and transmission under private vs. public communication, depends on how much the policy maker and the expert differ in opinion. If both have either moderate or very extreme opinions, the costs and benefits are the same. In contrast, when the policy maker is moderate and the expert has more extreme opinions, private communication is better, while if the policy maker is extreme and the expert has moderate views, public communication is better. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.