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作者：Migrow, Dimitri
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：This paper studies the design of communication hierarchies in a setup with a principal and multiple agents with private agendas. The agents observe unverifiable binary signals relevant to the principal's choice and the principal is uninformed. The principal can only decide who reports to whom and in which order. We show that a two-layer hierarchy where all agents report directly to the principal is dominated by hierarchies with a larger number of layers. We characterize conditions for the choi...
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作者：Bayer, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Peeters, Ronald
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Maastricht University; University of Otago
摘要：Farsighted economic agents can use their advantage to exploit their more myopic counterparts. In public goods games played on networks, such an agent will attempt to manipulate as many of his neighbors as possible to contribute to the public good. We study the exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player in such games. We show the existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal farsighted strategies in every network structure. For all optimal strategies, the set of absorbing ef...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' trembles onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We show that rational learning and weigh...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Milchtaich, Igal
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize s...
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作者：Xiong, Yan; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Toronto; Peking University
摘要：We study voluntary information disclosure by oligopoly firms in a setting in which firms learn information from asset prices to guide their production decisions. A firm that discloses information risks losing a competitive advantage over its rivals but may benefit from learning valuable information from a more informative asset market. Considering the financial market helps the product market escape a nondisclosure equilibrium with low total surplus. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit str...
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作者：Kretz, Claudio
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：In many aggregation problems, subgroups of agents have the right to predetermine certain properties of the aggregate. Yet, such rights may be inconsistent. In preference aggregation, for example, the 'liberal paradox' refers to the incompatibility of minimal liberal rights with the Pareto principle (a right to society as a whole). We show that, in general, rights to properties are consistent if and only if the following simple condition holds. Whenever rights are given to a critical (i.e., min...
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作者：Marimon, Ramon; Werner, Jan
作者单位：European University Institute; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We extend the standard Bellman's theory of dynamic programming and the theory of recursive contracts with forward-looking constraints of Marcet and Marimon (2019) to encompass non-differentiability of the value function associated with non-unique solutions or multipliers. The envelope theorem provides the link between the Bellman equation and the Euler equations, but it may fail to do so if the value function is non-differentiable. We introduce an envelope selection condition which restores th...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zijia
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Renmin University of China
摘要：We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower...
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作者：Mariotti, Marco; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Many economic situations involve the division of bads. We study a noncooperative game model for this type of division problem. The game resembles a standard multilateral bargaining model, but in our case, perpetual disagreement is not a feasible outcome. The driving feature of the model is that a player that makes an unacceptable proposal (causing breakdown with some probability) is made to internalize all the costs in case of breakdown. We show that as the probability of exogenous breakdown g...
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作者：Borgers, Tilman
