-
作者：Dur, Umut; Hammond, Robert G.; Kesten, Onur
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Sydney
摘要：We analyze sequential preference submission in centralized matching problems. Our motivation comes from school districts and colleges that use an application website where students submit their preferences over schools sequentially, after learning information about previous submissions. Comparing the widely used Boston Mechanism (BM) to the celebrated Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, we show that a sequential implementation of BM can achieve superior equilibrium outcomes relative to the stu...
-
作者：Roy, Souvik; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We show that a large class of restricted domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, single-dipped, tree-single-peaked with top-set along a path, Euclidean, multi-peaked, intermediate (Grandmont (1978)), etc., can be characterized by using betweenness property, and we present a unified characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on these domains. As corollaries of our result, we show that all the domains we consider in this paper satisfy tops-onlyness and deterministic ex...
-
作者：Freeman, Rupert; Pennock, David M.; Peters, Dominik; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman
作者单位：University of Virginia; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Harvard University
摘要：We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. Under l(1) preferences-for which a voter's disutility is given by the l(1) distance between the aggregate division and the division he or she most prefers-the social welfare-maximizing mechanism...
-
作者：Herweg, Fabian; Mueller, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bayreuth; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bayreuth; University of Wurzburg
摘要：Two non-transitive theories to model decision making under risk are regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987) and salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012). While the psychological underpinning of these two approaches is different, the models share the assumption that within-state comparisons of outcomes across choice options are a key determinant of choice behavior. We investigate the overlap between these theories and show that original regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) is a special c...
-
作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Fox and Tversky (1995) observe comparative ignorance: people are more ambiguity averse when they evaluate ambiguous and clear prospects jointly rather than in isolation. To accommodate such patterns, I relax the multiple priors model and allow subjective sets of priors to depend on partitions that are generated by feasible prospects. All sets of priors are derived uniquely on the corresponding partitions. This model violates transitivity, but preserves all other axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler...
-
作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Bleichrodt, Han; Li, Chen; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We introduce belief hedges, i.e., sets of events whose uncertain subjective beliefs neutralize each other. Belief hedges allow us to measure ambiguity attitudes without knowing those subjective beliefs. They lead to improved ambiguity indexes that are valid under all popular ambiguity theories. Our indexes can be applied to real-world problems and do not require expected utility for risk or commitments to two-stage optimization, thereby increasing their descriptive power. Belief hedges make am...
-
作者：Asriyan, Vladimir; Fuchs, William; Green, Brett
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answ...
-
作者：Midjord, Rune; Barraquer, Tomas Rodriguez; Valasek, Justin
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We study the aggregation of private information through voting in committees where agents are rewarded based on both the correctness of the committee decision (instrumental payoffs) and the correctness of their vote (expressive payoffs). Surprisingly, we find that even when expressive payoffs are perfectly aligned with instrumental payoffs, expressive payoffs can prevent committees from aggregating private information, suggesting that committees will make better decisions if agents are not hel...
-
作者：Nei, Stephen; Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak
作者单位：University of Exeter; Brown University
摘要：Decisions agents make before and after matching can be strategically linked through the match. We demonstrate this linkage in a game where universities either require students to commit to majors before matriculating or allow students to pick majors during their studies. The interaction between matching forces (competition for higher quality students) and principal-agent forces (moral hazard and adverse selection) leads to two equilibria that mirror the admissions systems in the US and England...
-
作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider an agent who represents uncertainty about the environment via a possibly misspecified model. Each period, the agent takes an action, observes a consequence, and uses Bayes' rule to update her belief about the environment. This framework has become increasingly popular in economics to study behavior driven by incorrect or biased beliefs. By first showing that the key element to predict the agent's behavior is the frequency of her past actions, we are able to characterize asymptotic ...
