The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
• 署名单位: Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105228
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: turnout; Referenda; ELECTIONS; Pivotal voting; Private value

摘要

We analyze the effect of handicaps on turnout. A handicap is a difference in the vote tally between alternatives that is added to the vote tally generated by voters. Handicaps are implicit in many existing democratic procedures. Within a costly voting framework with private values we show that turnout incentives diminish considerably across the board if handicaps are large, while low handicaps yield more mixed predictions. The results extend beyond the baseline model-e.g. by including uncertainty and behavioral motivations-and can be applied to the design of Assessment Voting. This is a new voting procedure where (i) some randomly selected citizens vote for one of two alternatives, and the results are published; (ii) the remaining citizens vote or abstain; and (iii) the final outcome is obtained by applying the majority rule to all votes combined. If the size of the first voting group is appropriate, large electorates choose the majority's preferred alternative with high probability, and average participation costs are moderate or low. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.