Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shichijo, Tatsuhiro; Fukuda, Emiko
• 署名单位: Osaka Metropolitan University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105233
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Non-rivalry; network externalities; Equal cost-sharing mechanism; Welfare maximization; Maximal welfare loss; Crowdfunding

摘要

Excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have similar coordination problems. In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate coordination mechanisms for both types of goods. We employ the equal cost-sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism, which has been studied for excludable public goods with non-rivalry. We find that the mechanism is optimal regarding two welfare criteria in an environment with generalized non-rivalry, within which this study characterizes the ECSMP mechanism. The results indicate that ECSMP is a promising mechanism in a broader context than that considered in the existing literature. ? 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.