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作者：Acharya, Sushant; Benhabib, Jess; Huo, Zhen
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：We show that sentiments- self-fulfilling changes in beliefs that are orthogonal to fundamentals - can drive persistent aggregate fluctuations under rational expectations in a beauty-contest game. Such fluctuations can occur even in the absence of exogenous aggregate fundamental shocks. Moreover, sentiments alter the volatility and persistence of aggregate outcomes in response to fundamental shocks. We provide (i) necessary conditions under which sentiments can affect aggregate outcomes in equi...
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作者：Gerasimou, Georgios
作者单位：University of St Andrews
摘要：We propose and analyze a general model of simple preference intensity comparisons. The model encompasses those that belong to the utility-difference class, has transparent behavioural underpinnings and features purely ordinal uniqueness properties. Its empirical content is characterized by an easily testable condition on dual behavioural data that include choices and additional observables with intensity-revealing potential that are often elicited in experimental/empirical work, such as survey...
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作者：Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev; Minarsch, David E. N.
作者单位：University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper develops a theoretical framework for the study of war and conquest. The analysis highlights the role of three factors - the technology of war, resources, and contiguity network - in shaping the dynamics of appropriation and the formation of empires. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Salamanca, Andres
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria are defined by a set of linear incentive constraints. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints yield shadow prices that are used to construct virtual utility functions that intuitively characterize the signaling costs of incentive compatibility. Importantly, we characterize the value of an optimal me...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung; Chen, Bin R.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Huazhong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Evidence for positive peer effects in production has been well-documented in empirical studies, and these effects are found to be more significant in teams composed of members with heterogeneous abilities. By modeling peer effect as mutual monitoring between members, we show that the total agency cost is minimized by maximizing skill diversities in the teams. This result provides a novel explanation for why worker heterogeneity can strengthen peer effects. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
